ABSTRACT: Recent studyoncertificateless authenticated key agreement focuses on bilinear pairing-freecertificateless authenticated key agreement protocol. Yet it has got limitations in the aspect of computational amount.So it is important to reduce the number of the scalar multiplication over elliptic curve group in bilinear pairing-free protocols. This paper proposed a new bilinear pairing-freecertificatelesstwo-party authenticated key agreement protocol, providing more efficiency among related work and proofunder the random oracle model.
Introduction
Introduction of mobile devices including mobile phones, laptops and etc. has made human life more comfortable. However, it has also brought urgent problems to be solved in the communication through insecure channels.
Al-Riyami and Paterson [1] introduced a new certificateless public key cryptography (CLPKC).CLPKCavoidedthe certificate management problems in the traditional public key cryptosystem (PKC) and the inherent key escrow problem in the identity-based(ID-based) public key cryptosystem [2] . The CLPKCis intermediate between the traditional PKC and ID-based cryptosystem. In a certificateless cryptosystem,a user's private key is not generated by the key generationcenter(KGC) alone. Instead, it consists of a partialprivate key generated by the KGC and some secret value chosen by the user. Thus, the KGC isunable to obtain the user's private key in such a way that the key escrow problem can be solved.Intuitively, CLPKC has nice features borrowed from both ID-based cryptography and traditionalPKC. It alleviates the key escrow problem in ID-based cryptography and at the same time reducesthe cost and simplifies the use of the technology when compared with traditional PKC.
Following the pioneering work due to Al-Riyami and Paterson, several certificatelesstwoparty authenticated key agreement (CTAKA) protocols [3] [4] [5] [6] have been proposed. All theabove CTAKA protocolsmay be practical, but they are from bilinear pairings. The relative computation cost of apairing is approximately 20 times higher than that of the scalar multiplication over elliptic curvegroup [7] .
Therefore, CTAKA protocolswithout bilinear pairings would be more appealing in termsof efficiency.The severalbilinear pairing-free CTAKA protocols have beenproposed [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 19] .Yang et al [10] pointed out that neither Geng et al. [8] 's protocol nor Hou et al. [9] 's protocol is secure. They proposed an improvedCTAKA protocol to improve the security. He et al [11] also proposed abilinear pairing-free CTAKA protocol but it is vulnerable to thetype 1 adversary [12, 20] . Bellare et al. [13] is the first to propose a formal security model for authentication and key distribution. Since then, there have been several extensions [14, 15, 16] given to the model. Among them, the modified Bellare-Rogaway (mBR) model [13] and the Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) model [16] are regarded as promising ones. In 2007,LaMacchia et al [17] presented a considerably strong security model-the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. The eCK model captures many desirable security properties including key-compromise impersonation (KCI) resilience, weak perfect forward secrecy (wPFS) and ephemeral secrets reveal resistance etc. while the originalCK model does notcover KCI attacks.
From the description of the eCK model for CTAKA protocolin the following section 2.6, one can know that the previous bilinear pairing-free CTAKA protocols [8, 9, 11, 12] are not secure in the eCK model. The protocols [10, 19] are provably secure in the eCK model. However, the user in protocols [10, 19] needs 9 and 5 elliptic curve scalar multiplications to finish the key agreement.Then it is necessary to design efficient bilinear pairing-free CTAKA protocol, which is provably secure in the eCK model.
In this paper, with the purpose of reducing the amount of computation, we shall propose an efficient bilinear pairing-free CTAKA scheme and prove our protocol is provably secure under the eCK model.
The remainder of this paper is organized follows. The section 2 gives some preliminaries. Our new protocol is given in the section 3. The security analysis of the proposed protocol is presented in the section 4. In the section 5, we compare our scheme with previous protocols. Finally, in the section 6 we provide some conclusions.
Preliminaries

Notations
For convenience, some notations used in this paper are described as follows. , , , , , Output:
Security model for CTAKA protocols
In CTAKA, as defined in [1] , there are two types of adversaries with different capabilities. Definition 1: We say that an adversary is an outside attacker if the adversary does not have the KGC's master secret key. We assume an outside attacker is able to replace public keys of users.The outside attacker is called the type 1 adversary .
Definition 2: We say that an adversary is an inside attacker if the adversary has access to the KGC's master secret key. We assume an inside attacker cannot replace public keys of users.The inside attacker is called the type 2 adversary . Let , , , be a set of parties. The protocol may be run between any two of these parties. For each party there exists an identity. There is a KGC that issues identity based partial private keys to the parties through secure channel. Additionally, the parties generate their own secret values and corresponding certificateless public keys. The adversary is in control of the network over which protocol messages are exchanged. ∏ , represents the -th protocol session which runs at party with intended partner party . A session ∏ , enters an accepted state when it computes a session key . Note that a sessionmay terminate without ever entering into an accepted state. The information of whether a session has terminated with acceptance or without acceptance is assumed to be public. The session ∏ , is assigned apartner ID , . The session ID of ∏ , at party is the transcript of the messages exchanged with party during the session. Two sessions ∏ , and ∏ , are considered matching if they have the same and . The eCK model in the CLPKC setting is defined by the following game between a challenger τ and an adversary
, . In the model, is modeled by a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine (PPT). All communications go through the adversary . Participants only respond to the queries by and do not communicate directly among themselves. can relay, modify, delay, interleave or delete all the message flows in the system. may ask a polynomial number of the following queries as follows. The game runs in two phases. During the phase of the game, the adversary is allowed to issue the following queries in any order:
: This allows to ask the τ to set up a new participant with identity . On receiving such a query, the τ generates the private/public key pair for .
: the τ responds with 's partial private key.
: the τ responds with 's secret value that corresponds to its certificateless public key. If the τ has been asked the replace public key query before, it responds with ⊥.
, : Party's certificateless public key is replaced with chosen by the adversary. Party will use the new public key for all communication and computation.
∏ , : the τ responds with the ephemeral secret used in session : The adversary is given access to the master secret key.
If the session has not been accepted, it returns ⊥,otherwise it reveals the accepted session key.
∏ , ,
: If the session ∏ , does not exist, it will be created as initiator at party if , or as a responder at party , otherwise. If theparticipating parties have not been initiated before, the respective private and public keys are created. Upon receiving the message , the protocol is executed. After party has sent and received the last set of messages specified by the protocol, it outputs a decision indicating accepting or rejecting the session. In the case of oneround protocols, party i behaves as follows:
: Party generates an ephemeral value and responds with an outgoing message only and a decision indicating acceptance or rejection of the session.
: If party is a responder, it generates an ephemeral value for thesession and responds with an outgoing message and a decision indicating acceptance or rejection of the session. In this work, we require , i.e. a party will not run a session with itself. Once the adversary decides that the first phase is over, it starts the second phase by choosing a fresh session ∏ , and issuing a ∏ , query, where the fresh session and query are defined as follows. Definition 3 (Fresh session): A session∏ , is fresh if ∏ , has accepted; ∏ , is unopened(not being issued the session key reveal query);
The session state at neither party participating in this session is fully corrupted; There is no opened session ∏ , which has a matching conversation to ∏ , .
∏ , : At some point, may choose one of the oracles, say ∏ , , to aska single query. This oracle must be fresh. If 0 , the adversary is given the session key, otherwise it randomly samples a session key from the distribution of valid session keys and returns it to the adversary.
After the ∏ , query, can continue to query except that the test session ∏ , should remain fresh. We emphasize here that partial corruption is allowed as this is a benefit of our security model. Additionally, queries may be issued to any party after the test session has been completed.
At the end of the game, must output a guess bit . wins if and only if . 's advantage in winning the above game is defined as:
Pr .
Definition 4.
A CTAKA protocol is said to be secure if:
In the presence of a benign adversary on ∏ , and ∏ , , both oracles always agree on the same session key, and this key is distributed uniformly atrandom.
For any adversary , , is negligible.
Our protocol
Our protocol also consists of six polynomial-time algorithms. They are described as follows. The shared secrets agree because:
|| || || || || || || || || || The correctness of the protocol is proved.
Security Analysis
To prove the security of our protocol in the random oracle model, we assume and as two random oracles [18] . For security analysis we use proof method of the reference [19] . Since is a random oracle, the probability of guessing the output of is 1 2 , which is negligible. The input to the key derivation function includes all information that can uniquely identify the matching sessions. Since two non-matching sessions cannot have the same identities and the same ephemeral public keys and is modeled as a random oracle, the success probability of the Key-replication attack is also negligible. Thus Guessing attack and Key-replication attack can be ruled out, and the rest of the proof is mainly devoted to the analysis of the Forging attack. As the attack that the adversary mounts is the forging attack, cannot get an advantage in winning the game against the protocol unless it queries the oracle on the session key. To relate the advantage of the adversary against our protocol to theGDH assumption, we use a classical reduction approach. In the following, a challenger τ is interested to use the adversary to turn 's advantage indistinguishing the tested session key from a random string into an advantage in solving the GDH problem. Let be the advantage that the challenger τ gets in solving the GDH problem given the security parameter . To solve the GDH problem using , the τis given a GDH challenge · , · and an oracle , , , where , , and the τ 's task is to compute , · . The τ simulates the game outlined in the section 2. During the game, the τ has to answer all queries of the adversary . Before the game starts, the τ tries to guess the test session and the strategy that the adversary will adopt. randomly selects 1,2, and two indexes , 1, … , : , which represent the -th and the -th distinct honest party that the adversary initially chooses. And then the τ determines the test session∏ , , which is correct with probability larger than 1 .
Let ∏ , be the matching session of ∏ , .The following two sub-cases should be considered.
CASE 3.1:
The test session has a matching session owned by another honest party.
CASE 3.2:
No honest party owns a matching session to the testsession. ▲ The Analysis of CASE 3.1
The strongest adversary is allowed to corrupt at most two out of three secrets for each party as follows:
: the user 's secret value; : the part of the user 's partial private key; : the user 's ephemeral private key. This gives to the adversary nine possibilities, called strategies (Lippold et al. [5] ), to break the protocol. In Lippold et al. [5] ∏ , ,then the τ returns to . Otherwise, the τ replies according to the specification of the protocol.
∏ , :the τ answers 's queries as follows. If∏ , ∏ , ,the τ stops the simulation.
Otherwise, the τ generates a random number 0,1 and returns it to .
As the attack that adversary mounts the forging attack, if succeeds, it must have queried oracle on the form as follows.
is the outgoing message of test session by thesimulator and is the incoming message from the adversary . To solve , , for all entries in , the τ randomly picks one entry with the probability and the τ proceeds with following steps: The τ computes .
Then
is non-negligible since we assume that is non-negligible. This contradicts the GDH assumption.
CASE3.1.7, CASE 3.1.8 and CASE 3.1.9 can be solved by the similar method. ▲ The Analysis of CASE 3.2
Through the definition of the freshness, the following two cases should be considered. CASE 3.2.1: At some point, the static private key owned by the party has been revealed by the adversary (Note that in this case, according to the freshness definition, is not permitted to reveal ephemeral private key of the test session).
This case can be solved by the same method in the CASE 3.1.8.
CASE 3.2.2:
The static private key owned by the party has never been revealed by the adversary . (Note that in this case, according to the freshness definition, may reveal party 's ephemeral private key in the test session.)
This case can be solved by the same method in the CASE 3.1.7.
If the adversary succeeds with non-negligible probability in any case above, we can also solve the GDH problem with non-negligible probability, which contradicts the assumed security of GDH problem. So we can conclude that our scheme bases its security on GDH problem.
Theorem 2.If it is difficult to solve the GDH problem,we can neglect the advantage of a type 2 adversary against our protocol.
Proof: Suppose that there is a type 2 adversary who can win the game defined in the section 2 with a non-negligible advantage in polynomial-time t. ▲ The Analysis of CASE 3.1
Through the definition of the freshness, we should provide the proof of CASE 3. This case can be solved through the same method in the CASE 3.1.3. If the adversary succeeds with non-negligible probability in any case above, we can also solve the GDH problem with non-negligible probability, which contradicts the assumed security of GDH problem. So we can conclude that our scheme bases its security on GDH problem.
Proposition1.
If two sessions are matching, both of them will be accepted and will get the same session key which is distributed uniformly at random in thesession key sample space.
Proof:From the correction analysis of our protocol in Section 3, we know if two oracles are matching, then both of them are accepted and have the same session key. The session keys are distributed uniformly since , are selected uniformly during the protocol execution.
From the above three theorems and proposition, we can get the following corollary.
Corollary1. Our protocol is a secure CTAKA protocol in the eCK model under the GDH assumption.
Comparison with previous protocols
For the convenience of evaluating the computational cost, we define some notations as follows.
: The time of executing a scalar multiplication operation ofpoint. [11, 12, 19] . The table 1 shows the comparison between bilinear pairing-free CTAKA protocols in terms of efficiency, security model and underlying hardness assumptions.
Since the scalar multiplication operation of point is more complicated than the addition operation of points, modular invasion operation and the hash function operation, then our protocol has better performance than Geng et al.'s protocol [8] , Hou et al.'s protocol [9] and Heetal.'s protocol [11, 12, 19] [11, 12] . From the table 1, we know our protocol has much better performance than previous ones. We conclude that our protocol is more suitable for practical applications. 
